E-Commerce in China: Price and Service Competition by Yulin, Zhang et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 2012 Proceedings Proceedings
E-Commerce in China: Price and Service
Competition
Zhang Yulin
Management Science & Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China., zhangyl@seu.edu.cn
Jian Hua
Marketing and Information Systems, University of the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, United States.,
JHUA@UDC.EDU
Zhang Jianwei
Management Science & Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China., 2004081045@163.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2012
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 2012 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Yulin, Zhang; Hua, Jian; and Jianwei, Zhang, "E-Commerce in China: Price and Service Competition" (2012). AMCIS 2012
Proceedings. 6.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2012/proceedings/EBusiness/6
Zhang et al. E-Commerce in China: Price and Service Competition 
1 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, Washington, August 9-12, 2012. 
E-Commerce in China: Price and Service Competition 
Yulin Zhang 
   School of Economics and Management 
   Southeast University 
   Nanjing, Jiangsu, P. R. China 
zhangyl@seu.edu.cn  
Jian Hua 
School of Business and Public Administration 
University of the District of Columbia 
Washington DC, USA 
jhua@udc.edu  
Jianwei, Zhang 
School of Economics and Management 
   Southeast University 
   Nanjing, Jiangsu, P. R. China 
2004081045@163.com  
ABSTRACT 
Currently, the majority of Chinese online consumers paid more attention to price and service quality. This paper studied the 
Price and Service competition in E-commerce of China. A price game within two online business companies is used in this 
paper. This study shows that the product’s utility to a customer has a great influence on decision making of the two online 
business companies. As the product’s utility to a customer varies, the two companies may compete or not. This paper will 
help US companies to get some knowledge about China Market and to avoid failures. 
Keywords 
Delivery time; price; service capacity; linear city model 
INTRODUCTION 
The population of the Internet users in China has been more than 500 million (CNNIC, 2012). In 2011, the estimated 
total money spent on online purchases in China was 127 billion US dollars (800 billion RMB). Currently, E-commerce 
market in China, especially B2C, is very competitive. Currently research about E-commerce in China is limited. However, 
the huge E-commerce market in China deserves more and more research works from the western academia.   
Doing business in China is different from in the U.S (Efendioglu & Yip, 2004).  We need to study E-commerce 
development in China and understand Chinese customers’ habits. The failures of EBay and BestBuy already indicated that 
US E-commerce models and experiences could not be totally copied and applied to China Market. EBay totally dominate 
C2C market in China before 2006. However, since 2006, EBay has been defeated by Taobao.com. Now, Taobao.com has 
occupied more than 95% of C2C market shares in China. Several clues already predicted the failure of EBay in China. None 
of EBay senior managers working in China can speak Chinese or understand Chinese habits. They didn’t want to understand 
the preferences of Chinese consumers. They don’t know that EBay is not a famous brand in China.   They didn’t know how 
to attract and serve Chinese consumers. At the same time, BestBuy and HomeDepot have closed their all stores in China, 
which announced their failures.  
B2C companies are battling for the market in large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, for several reasons. 
First, the online shopping already is well accepted by the consumers in those large cities. Second, the IT infrastructure in 
these large cities is better than that in small or medium cities. Third, shipping cost will be lower in these large cities. Fourth, 
many young people bear high working pressure and don’t have time to do shopping in local stores.  They prefer to buy online.   
Chinese online consumers, especially China’s youth, care about price and service quality, but the price only is not the 
most important factor affecting the purchase decision making of Chinese consumers. More and more Chinese online 
consumers would like to pay more to receive better service (Wang, Yao, & Huang, 2007). For a pure online B2C business 
company, the lowest price may not be a good idea to attract consumers. The lowest price benefits the consumers, but in the 
same time the lowest price shrinks the company’s marginal profit.  Chinese B2C companies already try to use the better 
service quality to replace the lowest price strategy. Today, more and more Chinese consumers love fast delivery services 
offered by online stores. Sometime, they even prefer to pay more to receive fast delivery services.  
In traditional industries, the price and yield always are the focus of competition among companies. Usually researchers 
assume that each production of products is identical. However, besides price and yield, there are some other differences. In 
1929, Hotelling (1929) established a price competition model of two companies within a linear city, which is the famous 
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linear-city model. Hotelling assumed that the two companies have different locations in a linear city and in order to get the 
product, consumers should not only pay the price but also have transportation expenses. In the current E-commerce, 
consumers care about the price and the delivery time. In fact, geographical differences of online stores do have some 
influence on customers’ purchase choices. In this paper, based on the Hotelling model, we study a price game between 
leader-follower online stores with two different delivery time guarantees.  
This research will explore the following questions: 
 How can an online business company maximize its profit in one large city? 
 Which factors will affect the company’s and customers’ decision making? 
 How can American companies know more about China Market? 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research results related to this paper mainly have two aspects: one is about the price, service capacity and delivery time 
guarantee competition; the other is about the service price and capacity decision with varied locations of service providers.  
On the first aspect, Chen & Wan (2003) studied the price game of two make-to-order firms with different service 
capacity. Their research indicates that a firm with higher service capacity or lower per unit operation cost could take a 
relatively larger market share with premium prices. Chen & Wan (2005) also studied the service price and service capacity 
competition of two make-to-order firms with a fixed market capacity. Their research proves the existence of Nash 
equilibrium and shows that in the equilibrium, the number of firms operating in a market depends on the capacity of the 
market and the duopoly Nash equilibrium is socially optimal if and only if there is one firm operating in the equilibrium.  
So (2000) studied the service price and service delivery time guarantee competition among firms with demands sensitive 
to both price and delivery time guarantees. His research indicated that firms will exploit their distinctive firm characteristics 
to differentiate their services. Assuming all other factors being equal, the high capacity firms provide better time guarantees, 
while firms with lower operating costs offer lower prices, and the differentiation becomes more acute as demands become 
more time-sensitive.  
Zhang, Tan, & Dey (2009) studied the service price competition between two web service providers offering functionally 
the same web services with service level guarantees. Their study shows that in the long term, the two providers intend to 
choose different service levels and service prices. However, in the shorter term, they may incline to the similar service levels 
and service prices. Fan, Kumar, & Whinston (2009) studied the service price and software quality short-term and long-term 
competition between two software service providers (SasS: software as a service, SWS: shrink-wrap software) with the 
different service time guarantee. Keskinocak, Pekgun, & Griffin (2006) analyzed the service price and lead-time competition 
among two firms under centralized decision making and decentralized decision making. 
On the second aspect, Dobson & Stavrulaki (2006) developed a model of simultaneous price, location and capacity 
decisions of a service provider with time-sensitive customers uniformly distributing on a linear city. They worked out the 
optimal solution with the consideration of the shipping delay.  
Kwasnica & Stavrulaki (2008) studied the service capacity and location competition between the two service providers 
who can choose their location on a linear city. Their study indicates that unless the cost of service capacity obtained is 
particularly low, two service providers will choose a limited service capacity and focus on the location competition. When 
the market capacity is large, the two service providers will not compete and service the customers closer to their own 
facilities while the market demand is small, two service providers will compete for some customers.  
Saidi-Mehrabad, Teimory, & Pahlavani (2010) studied the influences of the customer behaviors on the market shares of 
multiple service providers. They assumed that when customers face with a congested facility, they may be balking, reneging 
and veering. Their study shows that a provider with higher service capacity can occupy a higher market share. If the balking 
ratio is high, the market share of all the providers will be reduced. Price volatility will not have great impact on the market 
share of each service provider. 
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Model Formulation and Analysis 
In this research, we assume that two online stores (SP1, SP2) are located at both ends of a straight line with length l 
and the customers are time-sensitive and uniformly distribute on a linear city (see Figure 1).  We propose a price game of 
leader-follower service providers with two different delivery time guarantees.  Each customer has no preference for either 









This research has three assumptions: 
For either online store, the service system is M/M/1 type. Each online store aims to maximize its profit and each customer 
wants to maximize his/her utility. 
All customer’s reservation payment and the per unit time waiting cost are the same. The two online stores are located at the 
two ends of a straight line of a linear city. 
The two different delivery time guarantee are ,H Ls s ( H Ls s , Hs or Ls ,). SH is the standard shipping and SL is the 
expedited shipping.  The two online stores must ensure that the probability of meeting the delivery time guarantee for either 
online store must be at least  (  can be 0.95 or o.98).  Neither  of the two online stores can dominate the entire market in 
the city. 
Table 1 Notations 
λi
 
customer order arrive rate of Online Store i           i=1,2
   
 
i  delivery rate of Online Store i           i=1,2    
ip  Price of Online Store i           i=1,2    
i  
the unit operation cost of Online Store  i           i=1,2
     
representing the efficiency of an online store 
 
is  delivery time guarantee ( ,H Li   and H Ls s )  
( )g x  the function of shipping fee, x is the distance 
c  the unit capacity cost  
i  per unit time profit of Online Store i           i=1,2    
 v  the product’s utility to a customer 
0c  per unit time waiting cost of customer 
l  per unit distance arrival rate 
a per unit shipping fee 
 
 
In this paper, we write the customer’s net utility function as: 
𝑈 = 𝑣 − 𝑐0𝑠𝑗 − 𝑔(𝑥) − 𝑝𝑖    (𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿;   𝑖 = 1,2) 
SP1 SP2 
Customer 
City Length 1 
Distance to SP1 is x 
Figure 1 Linear-City Model 
Distance to SP2 is 1-x 
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Only when it satisfies  𝑈 ≥ 0, a customer could choose the service. Otherwise, they will not choose it. We denote 
the function of transportation cost as: g(x) =ax, where x is the distance between a customer’s mailing address and an online 
store’s warehouse, and a is the per unit shipping fee. 
In this research, we adopt M/M/1 queuing system, which represents the queue length in a system with a single 
server, where arrivals are determined by a Poisson process and job service times have an exponential distribution. 
The requirement that the probability of meeting the time guarantee for each online store must be at least can be 
written as follows( So 2000): 
              1 − 𝑒−(𝜇−𝜆)𝑠𝑗 ≥ 𝛼       (𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿)       (1) 
We assume that SP1 is the leader and SP2 is the follower. Based on the optimal price and the delivery guarantee of 
SP1, SP2 draw its own optimal solutions. If each online store cannot occupy the entire market, then in equilibrium there must 
exist a point (denote as A, the distance from A to SP1 is denoted as x and then the distance from A to SP2 is 1-x ). Then we 
can draw an equation as follows: 
 𝑣 − 𝑐0𝑠𝑗1 − 𝑎𝑥 − 𝑝1 = 𝑣 − 𝑐0𝑠𝑗2 − 𝑎𝑥 − 𝑝2       ( 𝑗1, 𝑗2 = 𝐻, 𝐿)         (2) 
From equation (2), we can find the value of x, then we can obtain the mean arrival rate. 
𝜆1 = 𝑙
𝑐0(𝑠𝑗2 − 𝑠𝑗1) + 𝑎 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1
2𝑎




𝑐0(𝑠𝑗2 − 𝑠𝑗1) + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1
2𝑎
 )    
SP1, as the leader, can choose 
Ls or Hs , and formulate the optimal service price. SP2, as the follower, can choose its 
price to have a significant impact on the equilibrium solution and the profit of SP1. So SP1 need to analyze the response of 
SP2 when it chooses a different delivery time guarantee. Therefore, we have two cases.  
 
Case 1: SP1 chooses SL 




𝜋2 = (𝑝2 − 𝛾2)𝜆2 − 𝑐𝜇2                   (3) 
       
                             
 
              
                      1 − 𝑒−(𝜇2−𝜆2)𝑠𝑗 ≥ 𝛼                                                                         (4)      
          st.         𝑣 − 𝑐0𝑠𝐿 − 𝑎𝑥 − 𝑝1 = 𝑣 − 𝑐0𝑠𝑗 − 𝑎(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑝2                    (5)       
                      𝑣 − 𝑐0𝑠𝑗 − 𝑎(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑝2 ≥ 0                                                       (6)       
                                                                 
 
Simplifying (4), we obtain: 
                              𝜇2 ≥
𝑘
𝑠𝑗
+ 𝜆2,   𝑘 = − ln(1 − 𝛼) ,    𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿             (7)   
We do not consider inequality constraint (6) and when   𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝜇2, 𝑗)  is optimal, constraint (7) must be binding. So we 
have: 
                                 𝜇2 =
𝑘
𝑠𝑗
+ 𝜆2,   𝑘 = − ln(1 − 𝛼) ,    𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿             (8)  
Proof : If there is an optimal solution(
* * *
2 2, ,p j ) which make constraint (7) to be strict inequality, then reducing 
*
2  
can increase the 
*
2 . So (
* * *
2 2, ,p j ) is not the optimal solution. So when 2 2 2( , )p  is at optimality, constraint (7) must 
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be binding.  
As
js is either Ls or Hs , we can regard js  as a constant. When we get the solution, we substitute Ls and Hs  into 
2 ( )js  and have a comparison. So we can get the optimal delivery time guarantee. 
Substituting (5) and (8) into (3), we obtain:  








p p c s s k




      (9) 
It is not difficult to get the solution of 






j La p c c s s
p











  ,j H L  
As for SP1, its optimization problem can be expressed as: 
       
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
,




                          (10) 
 
 





                                                        (11) 
                          0 1 0 2(1 )L jv c s ax p v c s a x p               (12) 
                             
0 1 0Lv c s ax p                                                 (13) 
 
 
For the same method above-mentioned, we can obtain: 








p p c s s a k
p p c l c
a s
 
   
      (14) 
Substituting 
*
2p  into (14), we obtain: 
             
1 2 0*
1
3 2 ( )
2
j La c c s s
p
     
   ,j H L      (15) 
            
2 1 03 ( )
8
j La c s s
x
a











     (16) 
Substituting (15) into 
*
2p , we obtain: 
       
1 2 0*
2
5 3 4 ( )
4
j La c c s s
p
     
 ,j H L . 
Substituting (15) and (16) into (13) which is equal to (6) , we can obtain:    
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2 1 0
0 1 0




a c c s s
v c s ax p v c s
     









   
  , 2 1 0
2 0




a c c s s
v c s
     
  , then we have: 
 If 
1v v , the utility of customers on the boundary point is negative, which means (17) is negative. If the two 
online stores are local monopoly, they don’t need to compete with each other. The optimization problem of SP1 
can be written as: 
1 1






       
st.     1 1
( )
1 L
se       
0 1 1 0Lv c s ax p     

















  . 
In the same method, we can get   𝑝2̂, 𝜇2̂. In order to make sure that the two online stores are in local monopoly, their 
make shares should be no more than 1. Denoting the market shares of the two online stores as 
* *
1 2, ,x x we have 
* *
1 2 1x x  ,
* *
1 20, 0x x  . We can obtain: 
0 1 2 0
2
L jc s c s
v a c
   
    ,j H L . 




M Lv a c c s
 
    . 
 If 
1Mv v , then when 1v v , the two online stores are in local monopoly. 
                      The optimal per unit time profit of SP1 and SP2: 


























  . 
 If 
1Mv v , then when Mv v , the two online stores are in local monopoly.  
 When
1Mv v v  , the two online stores are not in local monopoly. There is no Nash equilibrium 
 When SP2 chooses  SH, then denoting 
0 0 1 2L H
M
c s c s
v a c
a
   
   . 
 If 𝑣𝑀 ≥ 𝑣1, then when 𝑣 < 𝑣1, they are in local monopoly. 
 If 𝑣𝑀 < 𝑣1, then when 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣𝑀, they are in local monopoly 
 When 𝑣𝑀 < 𝑣 < 𝑣1, there is no Nash equilibrium. 
So from the above analysis, we can see that when the product’s utility to a customer is small, the market capacity is large 
enough for them to realize local monopoly. So the two online stores can choose their optimal solution without considering the 
choice of the other. The optimal ?̂?1, ?̂?2 are increasing in v . The profits of two providers are decreasing in the unit service 
capacity cost and the unit operation cost.  
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  If   𝑣1 ≤ 𝑣 < 𝑣2 






) and their respective per unit time profits 
are as follows: 





























 When SP2 chooses SH  
 If it satisfies 
* *
1 2 1x x  , then the optimal solutions are (?̂?1, ?̂?1) and (?̂?2, ?̂?2) and their respective per unit 
time profits are as follows: 


























  . 
                    From 
* *
1 2 1x x  , we can obtain 
0 0 1 2
2
L Hc s c sv a c
a
   
   . 
                   Denoting 




c s c s
v a c
a
   
   , then we have as follows. 
                   If
1Nv v , then when 1 2v v v  , there is no Nash equilibrium 
                  If
2Nv v , then when 1 2v v v  , they are in local monopoly. 
                          If
1 2Nv v v  , then when 1 Nv v v  , they are in local monopoly; when 1Nv v v  , there is no Nash 
equilibrium. 
SP2 as the follower should compare the profits in these situations and choose the right delivery time guarantee. 
 
 If 
2v v , 
* *




























   
  ，
 
In this case, the two online stores compete with each other for some customers and each customer can get positive 
utility. From the expression of 
2 , we can see that if 0, ,i a c  are unchanged, the delivery time guarantee of SP2 depends on 
service capacity cost. If the service capacity cost is relatively large, SP2 will choose 
Hs . Otherwise, he will choose Ls .From 
the expression of 
2 , we can observe that when SP2 chooses Hs , the per unit time profit of is relatively larger. This means 
that choosing relatively higher delivery time guarantee of SP2 is conducive to SP1. As for SP2, his choice of delivery time 
guarantee depends on the specific parameter values. From the expression of 
* *
1 2,p p ,we can see that 
*
1p is increasing in js  
and 
*
2p is decreasing in js . In order to compare the profits of the two online stores, we assume that SP2 also chooses Ls and
1 2  . We can obtain: 
 
*
2 3 / 2p a , 
*
1 5 / 4p a , 3/ 8x  , 1 2 7 / 32al    . 
Obviously, SP2 occupies a relatively large market share with a lower service price and get higher profit. From this, we 
can see that when the conditions are the same, the follower SP2 can obtain a second-move advantage and its per unit time 
profit is on less than the profit when it choose the same delivery time guarantee with SP1. 
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Case 2: SP1 chooses SH  
The process is similar with the situation when SP1 choose  SH . Denoting 
2 1 0
3 0




a c c s s
v c s










   
 
, the analysis is the same. 
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A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE AND DISCUSSION 
Given the parameters 
1 2 0.5   , 0.3a  , 0.2c  , 0 0.5c  , 4.4Hs  , 3.6Ls  , 4.5l  , log0.05k   .  
Then we compare the prices and optimal profits of the two online stores when they choose different delivery time guarantees. 
(1)When the two online store are in local monopoly, their optimal service price are the same due to the same the unit 
operation cost. When they are in competition, the optimal service price and the equilibrium point (denote as x ) are provided 
in Table1. 
Table 2 The price * *
1 2,p p  and equilibrium point x  





Ls  (SP1) (1.15, 1.08, 0.38 ) (1.35, 0.97, 0.54) 
Hs  (SP1) (0.95,1.175 ,0.21) (1.15, 1.08, 0.38 ) 
 
From Table 2, we can see that SP2 as the follower can occupy a relatively large market share with a lower service price 
if they choose the same delivery time guarantee. SP1 chooses  SL  
 
(2) The profit comparison 
1) When SP1 and SP2 both choose SL 
 
 
Figure 2 The per unit time profit of SP1 and SP2 when they both choose SL  
 
From Figure 2, we can see that if 
mv v , they are in local monopoly. Since all the values of  parameters are the same , 
they have the same profit. If 
1mv v v  , they may be in competition or in constrained monopoly; if 1v v , they are sure in 
competition. 











































The product’s utility to a customer v 
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(2) When SP1 chooses SL and SP2 choose SH.
 
Figure 3 The per unit time profit of SP1 and SP2 when SP1 chooses SL and SP2 chooses SL  
From Figure 3, we can see 
1nv v . So when nv v , they are in local monopoly. The profit of SP2 is zero, because the 
delivery time is large and the product’s utility to a customer is relatively small. No customer could choose to accept the 
service. If 
2nv v v  , there is no Nash equilbrium. If 2v v , they are sure in competition.  
From Figures 2 and 3, we can find that when the product’s utility to a customer is small, the two online stores are in 
local monopoly.  If SP1 chooses SL, SL is the better choice to SP2.When the two online store are in competition, SP2 can 
obtain more profits. 
When SP1 and SP2 both choose SH  or SP1 chooses SH  with SP1 choosing SL, the situations are similar with the above 
two figures. We know that SP2 can find its optimal service price, service capacity and delivery time guarantee after it knows 
the decision of SP1. However, as for SP1，he should study the product’s utility to a customer , market capacity and other 
parameters and the optimal response of SP2 when he chooses delivery time guarantee and make his choice. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we studied the price game of leader-follower online stores with two different delivery time guarantee 
constraints and changeable service capacity. The contribution of our work is to consider the spatial difference of the two 
service providers and two types of service delivery time guarantees constraint. We mainly analyze the problem that how the 
leader-follower online stores choose the delivery time guarantee and pricing the service in order to attain maximum profit. 
Our research shows that if the number of potential customers is fixed, when the product’s utility to a customer is smaller, the 
two online stores are both local monopoly. With the increase of the product’s utility to a customer,  the delivery time 
guarantee choices of the two online stores have a significant influence on their condition( compete or not). Besides this, there 
is no Nash equilibrium in some cases. 
When the product’s utility to a customer is large, no matter which delivery time guarantee they choose, they will 
compete for some customers. When the two online stores compete with each other, the follower has the second-move 
advantage. If the per unit service cost and the service capacity cost are the same, the per unit time profit of SP2 is higher than 
the per unit time profit of SP1. SP2 can draw its optimal solution after he knows the decision of SP1. However, as for SP1, he 
should study the product’s utility to a customer, market capacity and other parameters and the optimal response of SP2 when 
he chooses different delivery time guarantee. Then he can make his best decision.  
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E-commerce market in China is unbelievable huge than what we think. Western companies need to study and explore 
the characteristics and preferences of China online consumers. Ignoring the online purchase habit difference between Chinese 
consumers and American consumers will result in unavoidable failure in China e-commerce market.    
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